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Recovering the Nation, Part 2 : The Persistence of Nationalness

August 29, 2014

In the previous post I pointed to the centrality of the ‘national’ in the French account of influence. Although I’ve focused on France because of the relatively coherent theory you can extract from Foucher’s Atlas, the national cultural view is strongly present in the approach of many other countries large and small. Germany is the obvious example but I’d particularly emphasize that the post socialist reconstruction of Chinese and Russian external outreach has taken on board national models, not least in the emphasis placed on language.

From the perspective of a think tank in Washington or London the French discourse of influence with its discussion of the national and geopolitics may sound quaint next to the post international politics of global governance, climate change and the internet revolution. The response from Paris would be might be something like this:

Firstly, : “countries will always advance an agenda that is important to them. Why do you assume that your agenda is the only one? What about our agenda ? for instance of cultural diversity.”

Secondly, “the new agenda of global politics is an addition not a replacement. New issues will always be refracted through the lens of national differences. Nations are permanent issues and regimes change”   It’s noticeable that while ‘Europe’ is frequently invoked in Foucher’s book it is seen as an atout (an asset or even trump card) for French influence not as something that replaces France or its project of influence.

We don’t have to buy into a Gaullist metaphysics of the nation to recognize that they may have a point. The nation may be socially constructed but some social constructions cannot be dismantled in any politically feasible way.   Nationality does not mean a self conscious effort to assert or promote the nation but the existence of particular ways of seeing the world. As Billig argued in Banal Nationalism everyday life is shot through with assumptions of the national. This isn’t just confined to old nations. The most recent wave of the World Values Survey asked individuals in a variety of countries whether they were proud of their country;  in many former colonies or post communist countries 95% or more answered that they were proud or very proud. As might be expected answers in ‘post national’ developed countries were lower: Germany could only muster 70% and the Netherlands 81% but asking whether people felt part of the nation added another 10-20%.  Even a large part of the minority who refused national pride could not escape the nation as a social fact.

If we move from individuals to institutions the national remains important. Institutional models in government, law, and business are endure.   What the French see is that Anglo Saxon or French institutional models give advantages to some actors and disadvantage others (see for instance this issue of Mondes). For instance structuring contracts for major infrastructure projects on Anglo-saxon models tends to disadvantage firms that operate under a different legal system. In a 2012 book Sarah Stroup shows that British, American and French transnational NGOs remain closely linked to their countries of origins and operate in distinct ways. From my own work on PD institutions it is also clear that national models are highly persistent.

This suggests to me that it’s less the French insistence on the continued relevance of the national that looks odd but the refusal to recognize its significance.

In the final part of this series I’m going to point to some theoretical sources of this failure to recognize the national

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Recovering the Nation, Part 1: The French Theory of Influence

August 26, 2014

In last post I suggested that the importance the France has attached to questions of cultural diplomacy is a function of the way that the nation is discussed but this goes further: the French theory of influence sees France within a world of nations. In this series of posts I’m going to outline my take on the French theory of influence as a matter of inter-national relations before asking the question whether Anglo-Saxon policy and academic thinking has a blind spot towards questions of nationality and nationness what the implication of this are and where it comes from.

I’m becoming increasingly convinced that the failure of US and UK research to really engage with French (or German) concepts of statecraft is a major gap in our knowledge of public diplomacy. This is important not just because France is an important international actor in its own right but also because it shows up some of the gaps and assumptions within Anglo-Saxon (but also other liberal) modes of thinking about influence particularly the question of the nation.

Michel Foucher’s edited Atlas de l’Influence Française au XXIeme Siècle (Paris: Institut Française, 2013) provides a good place to start. which between the publisher and the institutional affiliations of many of the contributors has to be seen as a relatively authoritative statement. Although Foucher provides an up to date discussion the project that he discusses is pretty much the same one that was sketched out at the end of the 19th century.

The starting point: France before all is a culturally, linguistically and historically defined community that exists in a world of other similar communities, states are therefore merely the political expression of these communities (this is pure Herder). Within this world of diversity it is important to resist the forces of homogenization represented by capitalism/globalization/English/the United States. Indeed it is instructive that part 1 of the Foucher collection the fundamentals of influence opens with a chapter entitled ‘the other language'; the French language is important in its own right but it is also important as the alternative to English.   Hence France is not only engaged in a competition for influence among other countries but is also part of an effort to resist homogenization. Of course such an effort not only preserves French influence but also builds it through the country’s leadership role in this effort.

Running through this approach is a fundamental assumption of nationality that links everything together, the Atlas covers the legal system (and its characteristic modes of thinking), the internationalization of French companies, food, luxury goods, design, education, expertise, development aid, public health, expertise, cultural industries, ideas, the formal instruments: MFA, Institut, Alliance, broadcasting form only a small part of the discussion. It’s all linked together: If you buy a Hermès scarf you are buying into as aspect of France’s influence but at the same time French influence does not float in some deterritorialized realm of globalization but must be considered part of geopolitics because a realm of nations is a geopolitical one.

But isn’t this just soft power? In his introduction Foucher explicitly differentiates French influence from soft power. Soft power is not a scientific concept of universal applicability but a distinctly American project with an emphasis on power. Soft power is always discussed in relation to hard power and aims at getting the other to accept your objectives and models. France is not in a position to make such an imposition thus ‘influence’ needs to operate through interaction and reciprocity. I’m not sure that I quite buy the claims of ‘influence’ put in these terms is that different but I think that the emphasis that soft power should be seen as a US project is correct. What noticeable about French influence is the way that it is placed in the context of a global order composed of ‘countries’ whereas American (and British discussions) often take on a strongly universalist tone without reference to questions of national difference. France is the home of ‘the rights of man’ and so also has to balance claims of national difference with universal values but in my next post I’ll pick up on some implications.

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Nationalisms at Work: British and French views of Public Diplomacy

August 20, 2014

A few months ago I was writing about the development of public diplomacy in the 1970s and I was really struck by the contrast between British and French responses to the deteriorating economic situation of that decade. To simplify, the British had a series of enquiries and started cutting everything that couldn’t be tied to a narrowly defined priority. In France there was an effort to not just keep things the same but to do more even as money got ever tighter. Eventually at the end of the decade there was a comprehensive review of the cultural effort but it still doesn’t cut back. Putting economic performance or institutional differences to one side the French are clearly much more attached to engaging foreign publics than the British are. Why is this?

One observation is that British discussions of public diplomacy are always (and have always been) instrumental: we do this to achieve some other end.  Every 10 or 15 years there’s a call to focus on what the FCO would call ‘commercial work’.  Yet for France there’s always been a view that France’s influence in the world is tied to the projection of its language and culture, for all the more recent discussion of a diplomatie d’influence this remains the case. The French discourse is pretty obviously about the nation in the Herderian sense: language-culture-nation-state may not be identical but are closely related.

This created a puzzle – why don’t we get a similar pattern in the UK? Here Greenfeld and Eastwood (2005) offer a two dimensional typology of nationalism.  Firstly how do you join? If you can choose to join or leave the nation your dealing with civic nationalism, if you’re stuck with the nationality you are born with it’s ethnic. Secondly, if the nation is composite (a collection of individuals) or unitary (imagined as a single entity). Although this should give you four combinations in practice you get three. The most common version of the nation is ethnic and collectivist but France and the UK fall into the rarer categories of civic/collectivist and civic/individualist. The French nation is civic because anyone can join but it is collectivist in that FRANCE exists separately from the individuals who compose it, when General De Gaulle talked about FRANCE he wasn’t talking about a collection of individuals.

A civic/individualist version of the nation – which Greenfeld and Eastwood attribute not just to the UK but also to the US – is much less visible. C/I countries also tend to be bastions of liberalism thus the collective identity tends to dissolve into a universalist political language.   The collective aspect becomes clear in comparison with other countries. Policies have to justified in terms of concrete benefits. Nationalism is expressed in terms of universal claims. Minxin Pei made the point a few years ago that Americans are extremely nationalistic but don’t actually notice it in themselves or understand how it works for other countries.

Seeing British concepts of the nation in these terms explains why Britain is so relaxed about people leaving ie membership is an individual decision.  It also explains a few other things – why the British debate on the EU usually turns into a discussion of economics. It’s also noticeable that the debate on Scottish independence is exactly the same – anyone can be a member of the Scottish nation and you might have an extra pound or two in your pocket (or not) – Scottish nationalism is still civil and individualist.

I’ve got more to say about why public diplomacy research and International Relations more broadly should pay more attention to the implications of nationalism but that’s enough for now

Greenfeld L and Eastwood J (2005) Nationalism in Comparative Perspective, in Janoski T, Alford R, Hicks A and Schwartz MA (eds) The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Society and Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 247–265.

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A Tale of Two Diasporas: Chinese Control and British Indifference

August 18, 2014

At the Wall Street Journal Blog there’s an interview with James Jiann Hua To, about his book Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. This discusses the policies adopted by China to monitor, protect and supervise the tens of millions of Chinese citizens who live outside the borders of the PRC

As To puts it

The purpose of qiaowu is to rally support for Beijing amongst ethnic Chinese outside of China through various propaganda and thought-management techniques. For the vast majority of the 48 million overseas Chinese around the world, many will be oblivious to qiaowu and its activity. The main target groups are those who are open to and even welcome receiving qiaowu and closer links to China and its foreign service, such as newer migrants or PRC students abroad.

In contrast last weeks Economist had a piece on the British diaspora.  Despite five million Brits living abroad the message is the UK doesn’t really care:

Of 193 UN member states, 110 have formal programmes to build links with citizens abroad. Britain is not one of them. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s database of Britons abroad is patchy. Of all the high-flying expats with British passports your correspondent asks, only one—Danny Sriskandarajah, a migration expert based in South Africa—has had any contact with local embassies or with UKTI, Britain’s trade-promotion body. And his Indian friend has received much more attention from his consulate.

Indeed, India is a trailblazer in this field. It has an entire ministry for its emigrants. Mr Gamlen says it partly has this to thank for the success of its IT industry, built by Indians lured home from Silicon Valley and Europe. Other countries are similarly welcoming. Italy and France even reserve parliamentary seats for their diasporas.

Just because a country has a programme it doesn’t mean that it does anything but it’s interesting to note a certain continuity. After the First World War the British government mounted an enquiry into why some expatriate communities didn’t seem to have been as helpful to the war effort as those of some other countries. The report recommended programmes to cultivate British identity including subsidies for British schools. In another continuity the Treasury said there wasn’t any money (eg Fisher J (2009) A Call to Arms: The Committee on British Communities Abroad, 1919-1920, Canadian Journal of History, 44: 261–86.)

It’s tempting to attribute this difference in official attitude to regime type(authoritarian control versus democratic indifference and I’m sure that this is part of it, but France and Germany have always had extensive provision for expatriates regardless of political regime.   Part of the difference is can be attributed to differences in how these four countries conceptualize the nation. This is an issue I’ll pick up in my next post.

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Strategic Communication at NATO

July 30, 2014

In March the National Defence Academy of Latvia put out a report by Steve Tatham and Rita Le Page on Nato Strategic Communication: More to be Done?

They argue that despite the importance of Strategic Communication in NATO’s operations in Afghanistan the alliance has failed to properly institutionalize the practice or develop a doctrine for it. If the key argument within the US military has been over whether Strategic Communication is a communication function or an approach to operations Tatham and Le Page argue for the latter while seeing NATO as too committed to former.   In addressing this they argue that responsibility for Strategic Communications should move from the Public Diplomacy Division to the International Military Staff.

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Public Diplomacy and ‘The Good Project’

July 28, 2014

Cardinal Richelieu saw diplomacy as process of ‘continuous negotiation’. States have an ongoing relationship that is subject to continuing adjustment and that is the job of the diplomat. The same can be said of the ‘classical’ modes of public diplomacy or cultural relations – the operation of an information service or a cultural institute is seen as an ongoing activity. Yet over the past 30 years an increasing volume of PD/CR work (as well as aid/development activity) has been organized as projects. This comes both from the attempt to ensure the effectiveness of government activity but also from the movement of resources from geographical to functional bureaux within MFAs. I’ve been wondering what the implications of this ‘projectization’ of diplomacy are. How much difference does it make to think of diplomacy as a set of discrete projects rather than as the maintenance of a relationship?

As a result I was intrigued to come across a new book that explore the impact of project working on humanitarian relief NGOs.   In The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason Monika Krause of Goldsmiths College, London argues that instead of analysing humanitarianism in terms of lofty goals or hidden interests we need to pay attention to how an organizational dimension shapes what actually gets done. Based on research on NGOs desk officers she concludes  that they are concerned with developing a portfolio of projects that can demonstrate that they have achieved their specified objectives.  NGOs will avoid projects that are too difficult but also where effectiveness cannot be demonstrated because their reputation for effectiveness is important for in getting funding from donors.  The donors are frequently government aid agencies that need to demonstrate to politicians and taxpayers that they are getting value for money. The logic of the ‘good project’ drives attention away from the ultimate ends of policy towards good execution of discrete activities. In some foreign ministries (the FCO is one) much of the discretionary programming spend is allocated as project funding either to embassies, mittlerorganizations or other NGOs. Would a similar investigation into how funding was allocated find that the organizational requirements of the ‘good project’ (and the skills needed to write a good application) were the overriding factor in determining the allocation of resources. My suspicion would be yes.

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Four Thoughts on William Hague as Foreign Secretary

July 15, 2014

William Hague has stood down as Foreign Secretary after four years so four quick thoughts.

  1. Hague’s general approach to foreign policy can be seen as a continuation of New Labour minus the messianism plus a greater focus on bilateral relationships. Key elements of the Blairite approach such as the continued use of the ‘our interests are our values’ formulation and the importance attached to the Building Stability Overseas Strategy remained
  2. One of Hague’s major emphases has been on the FCO as an institution and the skills required by its staff hence initiatives like the reopening of the language school and efforts to benchmark against other ministries. Further he pushed efforts to expand the diplomatic network to give more weight to rising countries.
  3. On the other hand the FCO is increasingly hemmed in within the national diplomatic system. Hague seems to regard the National Security Council as the source of policy, even though successive Parliamentary reports have pointed to its inability to formulate strategy. Hague accepted the need for the FCO to make cuts in order to contribute to the austerity programme. At the same time with a shrinking budget the FCO has been forced to make an increasing contribution to the government’s commitment to spend 0.7% of GNP on development aid. One would expect the consequence of rising funding for DFID versus a cash strapped FCO led by a one of the most senior of the party’s leaders to be ongoing interdepartmental warfare yet from the outside there’s hardly been a whiff of this.
  4. This absence of conflict suggests to me that Hague’s incumbency has been fundamentally shaped by his loyalty to Cameron’s political project: to promote a modern caring Conservatism hence the unwillingness to rock the boat. Although this may have been to the good of the party I take the view that we need a rethink of British foreign policy and this certainly hasn’t happened under Hague. Even if Philip Hammond is seen as less close to the Cameron/Osborne axis at the heart of the government we’re still only 10 months from an election so don’t hold your breath for new thinking.
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