The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: A Longer Version

At the International Studies Association I presented a paper based on the four paradigms of public diplomacy concept that I blogged about here.  The paper is here: ISA 2012 v4

In the paper I argue that one way to improve our understanding of public diplomacy is through comparative studies but in order to do this we need ways of talking about national approaches.  Hence the four paradigms (extended diplomacy, national projection, cultural relations, and conflict mode (or political warfare) and the balance between them tends to give distinct national approaches.  In the paper I go further and suggest that we should map the paradigms onto national organizational fields (this is bit underdeveloped but I will come back to this.)  The final part of the paper applies these ideas to the UK, France, Germany and the US.  Looking at the balance between concepts and at the way they map onto organizational fields provides a way of talking about the ways that different countries approach external communications activities.

In terms of findings I argue that France and Germany models have been strongly marked by a concern with culture although institutionally the French model has had a much greater degree of foreign ministry steering. In both cases over the past 15 years there has been a greater interest in alternative models. Across all four countries there has been a growth in the influence of economically motivated projection (branding activities).  The US is summed up as ‘political warfare and its critics’ the Second World War, the Cold War and the War on Terror have had a strong impact on American models although it can be argued that PD2.0, 21st century statecraft etc are indicators of strengthening of a view of PD as an extension of diplomacy.   As soon as you start to make comparisons you are forced to try and explain the similarities and differences the become visible so this is has been an extremely fruitful exercise for me.

The response to the overall approach and argument of the paper has been extremely positive although Nick Cull and Ellen Huijgh raised some important questions about aspects of the US and French cases that will be addressed in the next iteration.

The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy

I’ve argued before that public diplomacy should be thought of as an umbrella term covering a range of different activities rather than a single thing what pulls the different activities together is communication with foreign publics.  Having spent the past few months digging into the history of public diplomacy programmes in different countries I now think that it’s possible to identify four distinct ways of thinking about external communication.  These are differentiated by the purposes of PD and are associated with particular organizational forms.  The relative priority of these paradigms differs across countries and across time.

1. Expanded Diplomacy. PD is an adjunct (or part of) diplomacy.  Hence it needs to be closely integrated with the routine operations of foreign ministries. Historically the organizational expression of this is the press office or news department.  It will often express itself through an engagement with the media
2. National Projection.  Public diplomacy is a matter of creating a favourable impression of our country often this will be regarded as the concern of the trade department but historically any other external communications activity will tend to take on  some aspect of projection concern.  Nation branding is the latest and most elaborated version of this paradigm.
3. Cultural Relations. In this version our external communications are part of an effort that will lead to  a transformation of overall relations with other countries though the development of cultural relations.  The concern is with medium and long term processes. The emphasis on the cultural is also reflected in an argument for the autonomy of this activity from the day to day influence of foreign policy. Within the cultural relations paradigm we can see a continuum between exporting our culture and a genuine mutuality.
4. Political Warfare (ideological conflict?).  PD is a matter of defeating an ideological opponent or spreading a set of political values.  One aspect of this paradigm is that PD should be separated from the work of the foreign ministry because the MFA is too wedded to the niceties of diplomacy.

These paradigms are abstracted from arguments around public diplomacy activities and are intended to be ideal types that summarize typical views of PD activities.   They are rooted in the purposes of external communications activities rather than means.   Exchange programmes can be run on cultural relations or political warfare grounds or broadcasting can be operated as an instrument of any of these paradigms.

The value of a typology like this is in developing a language for comparative research.  To what extent are these theories represented in national public diplomacy debates? To what extent do they map onto organizational structures?  What is the relative strength of these positions within the debate?  We can map these arguments onto national organizational fields

For example in the UK the different paradigms map onto different organizations – FCO as extended diplomacy (and at points political warfare) , cultural relations in the British Council and BBC, trade promotion, tourism etc as projection.  This has resulted in quite a stable organizational field where the FCO is top dog but everyone else has a degree of autonomy.  In the US the balance between the paradigms has been  different, political warfare is much more prominent, and the lines of argument cut across organizational boundaries in  a way that has tended to promote instability.

In future posts I’ll work through some of the implications of this typology.

UPDATED:  I’ve now written up a paper based on these ideas you can find it here

Strategic Communication and Foreign Office Libraries

I’m sorry for continued lack of activity here.  We still don’t have an internet connection at home and I’m still holding out for 30mbs if a certain well known cable company can hook me up without digging up too much of the neighbourhood.

In the meantime Louis Clerc added a fascinating comment on my post on the dissolution of the Foreign Office library – pointing to the Quai D’Orsay’s decision to open it’s library to researchers and what library lending records can tell you about the sources of policy.

Also Chatham House put out a report on Strategic Communications and National Security – which has caused me to start on another post or series of posts on the shapeless, voracious and ever expanding monster  that is stratcom. More soon.

Parliamentary Report on the Role of the Foreign Office in Government

Over the last few months the Foreign Affairs Select Committee has been conducting an investigation of the role of the Foreign Office.  They’ve now issued their report and supporting evidence here.  There’s a huge amount of material looking at the way that changes in foreign policy environment, changes in the government organization and technology have affected the FCO.  The actual conclusions don’t seem too radical compared with some of the ideas put forward by witnesses.  The report will be of interest to anyone looking at the current state of foreign affairs ministries and future prospects.  I’ll write more about this once I’ve had a chance to digest it.

Charles Crawford picks out a priceless quote from Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s evidence:

In terms of diplomacy – as in observing, analysing, reporting, negotiating and communicating with other Governments – I am still to be convinced that there is a Government less incompetent than the British one in these fields.

Q165 Mike Gapes: Less incompetent?

Sir Jeremy Greenstock: Less incompetent. I formed the view over my career that all Governments are incompetent in one way or another. Where you have a civil service or a diplomatic service that minimises the mistakes; that can handle complex issues; and that can deal with a number of balls in the air at any one time, you have a comparative advantage against what is out there on the field of competition.

Of course, some of the competition are allies and partners, but you would be surprised – I will name no names – how incompetent very close and admirable allies could be on particular cases. The British would come in, mop up, do the drafting, do the communication with other Governments and try to make the most of the situation. I think we’re very good at that…

Makes me proud to be British

Dutch Foreign Ministry Updates

Over at The Holland Bureau Giles Scott-Smith has news on changes at the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs.  There’s an emphasis on the importance of economic issues, more flexible means of representation and cut backs and a couple of additions to the diplomatic network; Latin America is out but Southern Sudan is in.  There’s a link to an English language summary of the changes.

Planning, Evaluation and Public Diplomacy Part 2: MFAs, Militaries and Aid Agencies

Looking at the material on planning for part 1 of this post raised a broader issue about planning and diplomacy.   From the point of view of scholars of International Relations or Communications planning seems like a tedious topic but actually says quite a lot about the nature of foreign ministries and their relations with the rest of government – particularly with Ministries of Defence and Aid Agencies organizations where planning has been taken much more seriously.  Planning is where organizational culture and an evolving external environment intersect with each other.

Military organizations are inveterate planners. This is not just to say that they draw up contingency plans but that planning is how they deal with the world and define who they are.  Military staff training is about how to plan;  if something happens the response is to start planning.   What the military means by planning is how do we organize things so that we can achieve a defined end state.  Planning is the means by which the various elements of the military organization are brought together.

I’ve also seen it said (I think in relation to Bosnia) that the reason that the US Army finds it hard to work with the State Department is because State doesn’t plan (my italics) , also that the problem with other armies is that they don’t plan (how much you plan is relative the British military plans much more than the FCO but not as much as the US military) . What this says to me is that the process of planning is something close to the heart of the military identity.

Given the range of moving parts in a military operation is obvious that plans are necessary  but planning also has other consequences.   In looking at the development guides in the first part of this post  I was reminded of Eisenhower’s maxim -’ plans are worthless but planning is essential’; the development community sees planning as way to build relationships.  Planning is a way to  learn about potential problems and opportunities, you learn about the people that you are working with and you develop a common understanding of what the problem is and what you are going to do about it that is relevant even if the specific plan is never used or has to evolve in unexpected ways.  This is an important lesson for relational (or collaborative) public diplomacy; that the process of planning is important part of the whole excercise.

In contrast with armies and aid agencies  MFAs have generally taken the line that the international environment is so complex and unpredictable that strategic planning is a waste of time.  Historically MFAs have done some  ‘policy planning’;   that is trying to imagine what the world will be like or how some issue will develop and  preparing policy options for what should be done – but  policy planning does not set objectives or allocate resources (Hocking 1999, Rubin 1987, Lan 2007).  Over the past couple of decades  this position has come under pressure from changing models of government organization and the changing nature of diplomacy itself.  As the scope of diplomatic action has expanded MFAs have been expected to become more strategic but there are big differences in how far these developments have gone. The FCO has moved towards a thoroughgoing strategic management approach while there are suspicions that despite innovations in planning the State Department doesn’t quite take this seriously.     Lane (2007) makes the point that the adoption of a much more strategic approach by the FCO over the past 10 years has changed the notion of planning from the old policy planning model to something that is much more strategic. As I’ve noted before the FCO seems to be much successful in meeting objectives that involve its own processes (eg consular support)  than the ones that depend on foreigners which perhaps suggests that there is something to the traditional suspicion of planning.   Lane also warns that operational planning can  lead to organizations focusing on the immediate objective  and losing sight of how the changing environment may require a change of policy.

What is interesting though is a certain convergence between the planners and the diplomats.  There is a rather obscure  debate going on in the US Army over the topic of ‘design’ .  The starting point is the danger that the current way of thinking about plans leads to rigidity and an inability to adapt to rapidly changing environments.  The new edition of field manual  FM5-0 The Operations Process draws on concepts of complex systems to advocate a mode of thinking that encourages adaptation and learning in response to a complex and interdependent world non linear transformations are the norm. Unsurprisingly some of the reaction to this has been frustration;  how are these abstract exhortations to be translated into real plans? I think that this also parallels the way that aid organizations are trying to break out of the rigidities that can emerge with formal planning.  To some extent it suggests a movement towards the traditional diplomatic position that improvisation is the only really feasible approach to international relations.

I don’t think that the divide between the military and aid planners and the improvising diplomats is going to disappear anytime soon but it does appear that both sides of the divide are moving towards each other.

Hocking, B., ed. (1999) Foreign ministries : change and adaption. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Lane, A. (2007) ‘Modernising the management of British diplomacy: towards a Foreign Office policy on policy-making?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20: 179-193.

Rubin, B. (1987) Secrets of state : the State Department and the struggle over U.S. foreign policy. New York: Oxford University Press.

The French Institute

A few months ago I posted some material about the plan to reorganize French Cultural Diplomacy.  The  new Institut Francaise launched in early January.

The basic thrust of the reforms seems to be get better coordination between the cultural work of the foreign ministry and of the French cultural institutes that exist in many cities around the world.  Up until now these institutes have worked independently of each other and the intent of the new organization is to create something rather more centralized like the British Council or the Goethe Institute – organizations that are explicitly mentioned in much of the discussion.  However, it looks like most of the existing cultural institutes will continue to operate indepently for the moment.  There is a plan for cultural activities in ten countries to come under the direct control of the new Institute for an experimental period – the success of this will have implications for the rest of the network.  The countries involved in the experiment are Cambodge, Chili, Danemark, Emirats arabes unis, Géorgie, Ghana, Grande-Bretagne, Inde, Koweït, Sénégal, Serbie, Singapour, Syrie.

Although the new Institute is supposed to be a joint enterprise of the foreign ministry and the ministry of culture it’s not clear from the documentation that I’ve seen how this will work in practice.

One other point is the priority that France continues to give to Europe in its cultural work, the British Council has been scaling back its work there in order to give more attention to the middle east and the rising industrial powers.

The web site of the Institut Francais is here. Here’s a press release in English on the launch of the organization and a fuller description in French.  There’s a collection of articles from the French press here.

As a bonus here’s an English Org Chart for the Directorate-General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships the part of the Foreign Ministry that deals with (among other things) cultural matters

US Embassy Social Media Report

Amongst everything else I’m trying to finish off my paper for ISA so not too much time for the blog at the moment…but via the PD2.0 twitter feed a link to a new report on US embassy use of social media by the State Department Office of the Inspector General.  Only time for a quick skim but some of the issues identified are an absence of coordination between different platforms and the level of resource required to generate an effective social media presence.

More generally if you have any interest at all in the operation of foreign ministries and embassies the OIG Reports are a very useful resource.  Even more useful if you are actually interested in State and US embassies.

More Questions on Resource Allocation

I’ve just spotted Candace Burnham’s post on jazz in American Public Diplomacy over at Mountainrunner.  I’ll make a comment about jazz later but this triggered a thought that went off in another direction.

One of the posts on this blog that gets the most hits is this one about the issues of resource allocation in public diplomacy.  I have to confess that I still haven’t got around to really trying to answer the questions for myself.  Despite this here is a little exercise.

If you have 100 units of resource to support PD how do you allocate it?

What fraction do you give to posts and how much to your keep centrally?

What fraction do you allocate to broadcasting?  What fraction do you allocate to digital diplomacy? What goes to supporting exchange of persons?  What about cultural exchanges?  What about different types of cultural exchange (the connection back to jazz)?

The pattern of resource allocation will vary across countries of different size, for instance countries with a smaller level of resources probably won’t devote money to broadcasting because of the fixed costs of the infrastructure.

[There's also the more constructivist point of what counts as a resource.  Some countries (eg France) are much less squeamish about seeing aid as a PD resource that a country like the UK.]

I think that this sort of exercise in valuable in two ways.  Firstly, different patterns of resource allocation might give a shorthand way of identifying different ways of thinking about PD in different countries.  Secondly, within institutions the normal pattern of budget allocation is what you got last year plus or minus x%.  If you start from your hundred units of resource can you justify they way that you allocate your budget? or is your budget divided on the basis of institutional inertia?

Public Diplomacy and Social Media

I’ve just got back from a week in India where one of the things that I was doing was talking about social media and public diplomacy so I was interested to see that Giles Scott-Smith has posted a summary of a talk that Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation at the State Department gave in the Netherlands.

On my travels I was reading Evgeny Morozov’s The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World  and the new paper from Linda Khatib, William Dutton and Michael Thelwall on State Department Digital Outreach Team so it’s  probably not too surprising that I’m sceptical about the Alec Ross world view.

Broadly speaking there are two sets of issues here.  Firstly the institutional ones of how you integrate social media into diplomacy.  What priority should you give to it and what resources should you allocate?  One of the lessons that I see in many of these initiatives like the Digital Outreach Team is the simple inadequacy of the resources relative to the size of the problem.  The second set of issues are more fundamental – what is the impact and potential impact of PD2.o initiatives.   This in turn feeds back into the resource problem.  Some effects might be feasible in theory but not with any likely level of resourcing.